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Abstract
Cognitive engineering is largely concerned with creating environmental designs to support skillful
and effective human activity. The goal of this chapter is to propose a set of necessary conditions
for psychological models capable of supporting this enterprise. An analysis of the psychological
nature of the design product is used to identify a set of constraints that models must meet if they
can usefully guide design. It is concluded that cognitive engineering requires models with
resources for describing the integrated human-environment system, and that these models must be
capable of describing the activities underlying fluent and effective interaction. These features are
required in order to be able to predict the cognitive activity that will be required given various
design concepts, and to design systems that promote the acquistion of fluent, skilled behavior.
These necessary conditions suggest that an ecological approach can provide valuable resources for
psychological modeling to support design. Relying heavily on concepts from Brunswik's and
Gibson's ecological theories, ecological task analysis is proposed as a framework in which to
predict the types of cognitive activity required to achieve productive behavior, and to suggest how
interfaces can be manipulated to alleviate certain types of cognitive demands. The framework is
described in general terms, and illustrated with an example from our previous research on
modeling skilled human-environment interaction.
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INTRODUCTION
Modernpsychologyjudgesits progressandproductsby avarietyof criteria. Reviewing a
number of paradigms in current cognitive psychology, Claxton (1988) suggests that the research
community gives no less that thirteen answers to the question: "How do you tell a good cognitive
theory when you see one?" Each of the thirteen criteria he mentions (e.g., experimental,
computational, evolutionary) has enough adherents so that research programs are judged
successful even if their products meet perhaps only one of these standards of merit. Research
activity in current cognitive science thus resembles a massively parallel search, where most of
Claxton's thirteen criteria for scientific success are suspended on any one search path so that
individual research efforts can proceed unencumbered by a diverse set of otherwise paralyzing
constraints. For example, in certain paradigms computational realization is the primary concern,
mathematical formalization the major constraint in others, and in still others a necessary condition
for a theoretical model may be a demonstration that the proposed cognitive mechanisms and
processes could have emerged through human development or evolution. The eventual success of
this divide and conquer venture, of course, hinges not so much on whether each of the many
paradigms meets its own goals, but rather, on whether we are somehow able to integrate the
resulting array of research products into useful and coherent theory.
It is natural to wonder whether we have decomposed our research efforts in a way that will
allow for eventual theoretical unification. One primary concern is whether the many research
paradigms that comprise cognitive science are moving along diverging or converging paths.
Perhaps this is a question best left for time to decide. I am concerned, however, that although
strict and dogmatic adherence to a single scientific criterion may lead to individually successful
hillclimbing, when considered overall we may find we have all climbed different hills, and if
anything, actually increased the difficulty of the journeys between us. A coherent, useful cognitive
theory will have to meet a large number of constraints. Rarely, however, do good solutions to
problems which involve meeting multiple constraints emerge by decomposing the problem via the
constraints themselves. Knowing the least expensive restaurant in town, the one with the best
food, and the one with the healthiest menu is not particularly helpful in allowing one to find a good
square meal at a fair price.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify a set of necessary conditions for psychological models
capable of supporting the design of environments to promote skillful and effective human activity,
i.e., cognitive engineering (Fischoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1978; Norman, 1986; Rasmussen,
1986; Woods and Roth, 1988). This effort is motivated by my own limited success in attempting
2to applytheproductsof cognitivescienceto cognitiveengineering.My experienceshaveled beto
believethatthecentralproblemthatneedstobeovercometo maketheproductsof cognitivescience
morerelevantto designis identifyingamoreproductivesetof dimensionsalongwhichmodeling
effortscanbedecomposed.We simplymustdecomposethecomplexproblemof cognitive
modelingin orderto makeanyheadway.However,for cognitiveengineeringatleast,the
decompositionmustbederivedfrom anoverallframeworkcapableof ensuringthattheresulting
researchproductscanbereassembledinto acoherentheoryusefulfor design.
A descriptionof a solutionto anyproblem,evenif expressedonly asa setof necessary
conditions,playsacrucialrolein formulatingaproblemdecompositionstrategycapableof
ensuringthatthesubproblemsolutionscanbeeffectivelyintegrated.We haveto knowwherewe
aregoingif wewantto get there. In termsof thepreviousanalogy,wehaveto know thatourgoal
is agoodsquaremealatafair pricein orderto determinehowto decomposetheproblemof finding
anappropriaterestaurant.A necessarysteptowardamoreapplicablecognitivescience,therefore,
isa statementof thethesetof constraintsthatmustbemetif apsychologicalmodelis to support
design.Theremaybenogoodreasonto expectthatthesetof constraintsthatmustbesatisfiedto
supportdesignareidenticalto thesetof constraintscognitivescientistsnormallyuseto guidetheir
scientificexplorations.In fact,I will suggestbelowthatthenecessaryconditionsfor anacceptable
psychologicalmodelin cognitivesciencearequitedifferentthanthenecessaryconditionsfor a
psychologicalmodelcapableof guidingdesign.Manyof thedifficulties involvedwith trying to
applycognitivesciencemodelingariseoutof thismismatch.Cognitivesciencehassimply
decomposedits centralproblemin amannerthatis veryunfortunatefor thecognitiveengineer.
As Carroll(1991)hasnotedin regardto thefailureof psychologyto meaningfullycontributeto
understandingtheproblemof human-computerinteraction(HCI),therealizationthattheproducts
of abasicsciencedonotprovideeffectiveresourcesfor applicationcanprovideimportantlessons
for thebasicscienceitself (alsoseeFlach,1990b;Gibson,1967/1982;Neisser,1976). The
solutionto theproblemof creatingascientificbasisfor cognitiveengineeringis notmerelyoneof
improvingthedesigner'saccessto researchfindings(e.g.,Meister,1989),movingresearchinto
naturalisticor operationalcontexts(e.g.,Klein, 1989),or improvinggeneralizablityfrom
experimentalresults(e.g.,Hammond,Hamm,andGrassia,1986),althougheachof thesegoalsis
surelyimportant.Rather,I amconvincedthatthesolutionmustlie in areformulationof the
questionsposedby thebasicpsychologicalresearchitself: areformulationdrivenby an
understandingof thepsychologicalnatureof thedesignproductandtheknowledgethatis required
in orderto createit.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF THE DESIGN PRODUCT
A standard modeling approach in cognitive psychology is to hold a task environment relatively
fixed and to create a description of the cognitive activities underlying a person's behavior in that
environment. The designer, on the other hand, is faced with the opposite challenge of creating an
environment to elicit a desired behavior, with the ultimate goal being the creation of a design that is
maximally consistent with the principles underlying how people skillfully and effectively interact
with the world. In problem solving terms, the solution space for the scientist is the set of plausible
cognitive theories while the solution space for the designer is the set of technologically feasible
environments. We can thus characterize the scientist's problem as a search among possible
cognitive "solutions" to a given task, and the designer's problem as a search among possible
environments to obtain a given cognitive solution. These are symmetrical psychological problems
of comparable subtlety and difficulty, requiring equally sophisticated empirical and theoretical
methods. In this sense a theoretical/applied dichotomy does not appear to be a faithful way of
portraying the difference between the practices of cognitive psychology and environmental design.
One reason, though, for the perpetuation of the theoretical/applied distinction is a lack of
appreciation for the psychological nature of the design product. While the scientist creates theories
of cognitive function, it is assumed that the designer creates not theories but merely environments:
a mix of hardware and software that is best conceived in technological rather than in psychological
terms. But this perspective is based on an overly restrictive view of what the environment is, from
the standpoint of understanding human behavior. Although a design product may be implemented
in hardware and software, this is the wrong level at which to view the relevant features of that
product, just as it would be wrong to look for the relevant features of a psychological theory in the
software or ink in which it is realized.
As Carroll and Campbell (1989) have noted, each design product is actually an instantiation of
the designer's theories of how the environment influences how people behave, think, and skillfully
perform, however rudimentary and fragmentary these theories may be. Although the (good)
psychological theory is only implicit in the design of a (good) VCR interface, for example, it is
nonetheless real in exactly the same sense that the physical theories and electrical engineering
principles implicit in the design of the inner workings of the VCR are real. If you want to
understand or predict the functionality of the VCR, you had better know the operative physical
theories underlying its design. Similarly, if you want to understand or predict human interaction
with the VCR, you had better know the psychological theory underlying its design as well. While
the VCR can of course be looked at as an assemblage of physical matter, this is the wrong level at
which to look for the relevant structure of the machine, either for understanding electromechanical
4functionor for understandinguserinteraction.Boththeelectricalengineerandcognitiveengineer
structurethephysicalmatterusingorganizingprinciplesderivedfrom theorieswithin their own
disciplines.It is theadequacyof thesetheories,ratherthananyfactssolelyaboutthephysical
form of themachine,thatdeterminewhethertheVCR will play,andwhethertheusercanplay it.
Eachinstanceof humaninteractionwith anyartifactis thusapsychologicalexperimentesting
theassumptionsembodiedin theenvironmentaldesign(of.Wise's (1985)construalof an
architecturaldesignin termsof scientifichypotheses).Althoughit maybefashionablewithin the
cognitiveengineeringcommunityto bemoanhowlittle guidancemodernpsychologyprovidesthe
designer,thepsychologicalnatureof thedesignproductis inescapable.Thecorrectresponseto
thecurrentandunfortunatelackof applicablepsychologicalresearchisnot toattempttodo
psychology-freedesign(sincethis is impossible-- thedesignwill notbeapsychologicalbut
insteadreflect thedesigner's"folk" psychologicaltheory),butratherto askwhatkindsof
psychologicalmodelsareneededto supportcognitiveengineering,andto beginthe longrange
empiricalandtheoreticalworknecessaryto realizethem.
This is not to imply, of course,thatcognitiveengineershouldwait for amoreapplicable
psychologyto emergebeforemakingdesigncommitments(thiswouldbehopelesslynaive),or
shouldturnall attentionto modelingandawayfromthedesignof prototypesandexpanding
technologicalopportunities.It maybe,asBraitenberg(1984)hassuggested,thathumancapacities
for synthesisfar exceedcapacitiesfor analysis,in thesensethatourcreativeproductsreflecta
degreeof implicit or tacitknowledgethatis far moreelaborateandrich thantheknowledgewecan
explicitly stateandformalize. Thedirectmanipulationinterfacewasnotdeducedinanyinteresting
sensefrom psychologicaltheory-- in fact,acasecouldbemadethatwe still havenounified
psychologicaltheorythatwouldpredicttheprofoundsuperiorityof directmanipulationover
commandinterfacesfor varioustasks.It just sohappenedthatin thiscasethedesignerhadan
implicit understandingof howpeoplenaturallyinteractwith theworld thatwascloserto thetruth
thananyexplicit andformalpsychologicaltheoryavailableatthattime. While cognitive
psychologistsmaybeableto identifywhycommand-lineinterfacesareinefficient in variousways,
it wasthedesignersandnotpsychologicalresearchthatpointedtowardenvironmentsthatsupport
moreefficientinteraction,afinding thatshouldprobablyinformpsychologicalresearchitself.
Thereis acatch,however,to thisdesign-as-researchstrategy.Assumingaparticularprototype
of adesignconceptis successful,anyusefulgeneralizationsthatemergefrom creatingthe
prototypewill beat thelevelof thepsychologicalassumptionsunderlyingthedesign,ratherthanat
thelevelof theparticulartechnologiesusedto implementhedesign.To returnto apoint made
earlier,thehardwareandsoftwareimplementationis thewronglevel to look for therelevant
featuresof thedesignproduct.Especiallyin HCI, a vastamountof researcheffort hasbeen
expendedtrying to answerquestionscomparingvariousinterfacetechnologies,for example,
designoptionssuchasscrollingwindows,hypermedia,etc. Thisresearchis of dubiousvalue(see
alsoVicente,thisvolume),sincethe"it depends"answersproducedby sucheffortswill only lead
to aneverendingseriesof technology-specificdesignprinciples,ratherthanastableandgenerative
theoreticalaccountof human-environment interaction that can guide design in novel situations.
To profit from the design-as-research strategy, then, it is incumbent upon the researcher to
make explicit the psychological assumptions that contributed most to the success of the prototype
system. A successful system demonstrates nothing other than its own success, unless the possibly
implicit psychological theory underlying the design is articulated. Although forcing the researcher
to articulate the theoretical assumptions prior to environmental design (as would be demanded by
traditional experimental psychology methodology) may actually impede progress -- synthesis may
be more efficient than analysis -- the hope for generalizable conclusions from such demonstrations
surely rides on whether the researcher can subsequently identify the psychological hypotheses that
were validated by the success of the prototype. There is probably no alternative to traditional
experimental methodology for this purpose. A research program using the design-as-research
strategy must include both an initial synthesis phase followed by an analysis phase where the
implicit psychological theory guiding synthesis is made explicit, tested, and communicated.
MODELING TO SUPPORT DESIGN
I have argued that a good psychological theory is a necessary aid to design by discussing the
essential psychological nature of the design product, and also by showing that the problem faced
by the designer is not one of mere application but is instead itself a theoretical problem comparable
to that faced by the scientist. A search for environments to promote a particular mode of cognitive
activity and behavior (the designer's task) is no more an applied endeavor than is a search for
accounts of cognitive activity and behavior that are promoted by particular environments (the
scientist's task). There is, however, an important difference between these two problems. The
designer and scientist search in opposite directions; one reasons over environmental models while
the other reasons over cognitive models. It should be expected, therefore, that different types of
heuristic guidance will be necessary to direct search in the two cases. As a result, the theories that
best provide heuristic guidance to the scientist will have different properties than the theories that
best provide heuristic guidance to the cognitive engineer. Let us examine how the theories that
would best support reasoning over environments might differ from the theories that would best
support reasoning across cognitive activities.
6Muchof ourcurrentunderstandingof cognitive-levelhuman-environmentinteractionconsists
of asetof somewhatindependent<environment-process-behavior>t iples,eachof whichprovides
apsychologicalmodelof howapersonmightachieveaparticularbehaviorin a specified
environment.Whenthedifficult but importantjob of integratingthisknowledgeintocoherent
theoryis attempted,theseeffortstypically focuson integratingacrosstheprocessandbehavior
dimensionsratherthanacrosstheenvironmentdimension.Theresultis thatunderstandingthe
environmentalcontributionto behaviorisa largelyignoredcomponentin thetheoreticalunification.
Oneapproach,for example,to achievingtheoreticalunificationof thissetof triplesis to integrate
acrossthebehaviordimension.Theresultsherearepowerful,typicallyhybrid"cognitive
architectures"(CardandNewell, 1989).Thesegeneralpurposecognitiveframeworkshavethe
processingresourcesto produceawidevarietyof behaviors,from simplemotorresponsesto
complexproblemsolvingandplanning.Yet anotherapproachis to integrateprimarily acrossthe
processdimensionin anattemptto showthatthefunctionalityof awidevarietyof existingmodels
canbesubsumedunderasingleprocessmodelingformalism. Cognitivemodelsdemonstrating
howsymbolicprocessingtechniquescanbeimplementedusingneuralnetworkor connectionist
formalismsaregoodexamplesof partialtheoreticalunificationalongtheprocessdimension.
Theoreticalintegrationsalongtheenvironmentdimension,however,arehardlyeverattempted
butarecritically neededto supportthecross-environmentalreasoninginherentin design. It should
notcomeasasurprisethatmostcognitivepsychologistsarenotoverlyconcernedwith this typeof
theoreticalunification,sinceanacceptablescientificproductis amodelof behaviorin aspecified
environment,andrarelyisreasoningbackwardsfromcognitivetheoryto environmentrequired.
Exceptperhapsin experimentaldesignitself,rarelyis thecognitivepsychologistforcedto reason
acrossenvironmentsin orderto activatespecifiedcognitivemodes.Significantexceptions(i.e.,
attemptsattheoreticalintegrationacrossenvironmentalinfluencesoncognitionandbehavior)are
Rasmussen's(1986)theoryof multi-levelenvironmentalrepresentationasreflectedin the
"abstractionhierarchy,"andHammond,Hamm,Grassia,andPearson's(1987)effortsto obtaina
richenoughsetof environmentalandtaskdescriptorsothatthecognitivemodeunderlying
judgmentbehavior(e.g.,analytical,intuitive)canbepredictedandpromotedthrough
environmentalmanipulation.Only aunifiedtheoryof theenvironmentalinfluencesoncognition
canguidethedesigner'ssearchfor environmentsto activatespecifiedcognitiveprocesses.
But whatwouldaunifiedtheoryof theenvironmentlook like, andwhattypesof guidance
wouldit provide?Whatwouldbeintegratedin suchatheorywouldbethediversesetof
knowledgeof whatthepsychologicallyrelevantaspectsof theenvironmentmightbe,for the
purposeof trying to understandorpredicthumanbehaviorandperformance.Onemust,for
example,determinewhenit will beappropriatetounderstandtheenvironmentin termsof stimuli
andreinforcementsasin behaviorism;cues,criterionandfeedbackasin modelsof judgment;
options,chancenodes,choicenodesandprobabilitydistributionsasin decisiontheory;initial
states,goalstatesandoperators as in Newell and Simon's (1972)problem solving theory;
affordances or consu'aints on action as in Gibson's (1979) ecological theory, system state variables
and differential equations as in manual control theory, and so on.
Each of the above forms of environmental description has its place. No single representation of
environmental structure will do justice to understanding the many different forms of cognition and
behavior observed in complex human-environment interaction (Rasmussen, 1986). The reflection
of environmental structure in behavior is manifest in various ways, and each way is suggestive of a
different model that best describes the structure of the environment to which productive behavior
must be sensitive. A large part of design activity, in fact, can be viewed as the selection of
appropriate environmental descriptions. In some cases, the cognitive engineer faces the problem of
selecting an environmental description for an existing candidate design that will assist in predicting
the cognitive activity and behavior the environmental design will promote. In other cases in which
the cognitive engineer can operate earlier in the design cycle, the central problem will be to create a
design concept, expressed as an environmental model, that promotes a specified mode of cognitive
activity maximaIIy consistent with the demands of a task. Guidance for both of these cognitive
engineering activities can only come from theoretical frameworks that support the designer's
reasoning over alternative environmental models.
Psychology may already have the rudiments of such a theory, but perhaps oddly, this
knowledge is expressed not so much in existing models of cognitive activity, but rather in the
process of designing experiments capable of successfully activating those cognitive activities for
scientific study. That is, it is the often tacit and unformalized knowledge guiding experimental
design in studies of cognition that approaches the type of understanding needed to reason
effectively over environmental models. When successful, the knowledge underlying the
experimenter's ability to promote a particular mode of cognitive activity is quite similar to the type
of knowledge necessary to guide system design. Much has been made of the inability of basic
experimental psychology research to guide design (e.g., Rouse, 1987, Meister, 1984), but perhaps
the fundamental difficulty is that the knowledge the designer needs goes beyond the experimental
findings, it may approach the knowledge needed to have actually designed these experiments.
ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MODELING
Cognitive engineering thus demands techniques for environmental modeling with a strong
theoretical basis, and the resulting environmental models must be as explicit, formal, and precise as
the models used to describe internal cognitive activity. A cognitive psychology capable of
predicting environmentally situated behavior and of supporting design will therefore have to be
concerned as much with the environment as with internal cognitive activity (e.g., Brunswik, 1952;
Gibson, 1979; Anderson, 1991). When one looks at the types of models produced by current
cognitive psychology, however, rarely does the environmental model receive close to the amount
of attention as does the internal cognitive model. There are at least three reasons for this state of
affairs.
First, experimental psychologists often feel the need to simplify their environments for the
purposes of control, and are thus able to get by with highly simplistic and impoverished
environmental models (compare the length of the stimulus description -- the environmental model --
with the length of the description of the internal psychological model in most papers in the
cognitive experimental literature). Second, and especially in research within the cognitive science
orientation, often no distinction is even made between the description of the external environment
and the subject's internal representation of the environment. While it may indeed be the case that
interesting questions can be answered using such an approach (e.g., differences in the types of
internal representations used by expert and novice problem solvers), these accounts start so far
downstream that they fail to capture any influences of the external problem representation upon the
efficiency of problem solving activity (but see Larkin and Simon, 1987). Finally, rarely is it the
case that researchers working within an established paradigm are forced to reason across widely
varying environmental conditions, with the result that assumptions about environmental
descriptions can remain implicit within a given research program. There may be no pressure to
unconfound the environmental from the internal constraints on cognition and behavior when
environmental manipulations are made over a very narrow range.
Thus, the open problem for cognitive engineering is to determine under what environmental
conditions various cognitive activities will be activated, and required, for effective task
performance. To evaluate a candidate design, the issue is not only to understand cognitive
processes such as problem solving, decision making, and working memory, but also to determine
what problems will have to be solved, what decisions will have to be made, and what working
memory demands will be, given various design concepts for a particular task.
In the following I will discuss two types of constraints on acceptable psychological models that
arise due to the need to represent both internal and external influences on cognition and behavior.
Thefirst setof constraintsarestructural.I will arguethattheamodel'sstructuremustbecapable
of representingbothcognitiveandenvironmentalorganizationin asingle,unifiedformat;i.e., that
theappropriateunit of analysisandmodelingmustbe thehuman-environmentsystem,ratherthan
thehumanalone. Thesecond set of constraints concern the content of acceptable models. I will
suggest that cognitive engineering is most in need of environmental models that assist in
understanding fluent, skilled human interaction with the world, rather than environmental models
that rationalize detached intellectual activity. In most cases the design goal is (or should be) to
create a design which promotes fluent and skilled activity, rather than a design which promotes
cognitively-intensive control of behavior. We require environmental models that capture the
features of environments that promote effective, skilled performance in order to define a design
target and also to identify the causes of error-prone cognitive activity in current systems.
Modeling the Integrated Human-Environment System
One of the earliest attempts to model human-machine interaction concerned manual control
behavior, such as steering a car or flying an aircraft. Engineers familiar with the design of
electromechanical feedback control systems turned their attention to modeling the human as a
feedback control system in order to assess human capabilities and limits so that vehicles could be
designed so that control demands were within these limits. Control theory has a weIl specified
language for environmental modeling. The controlled "plant" (airplane, automobile) can be
described in terms of a transfer function that relates system inputs (steering adjustments) to system
outputs (heading). The human as a feedback controller can be described in similar terms. In this
case the input might be the heading of the automobile and the output would be a steering command.
As Flach (1990a) notes, the goal in this endeavor was to discover the human transfer function; i.e.,
a description of the function relating stimuli to response during manual control behavior. At this
schematic level of description, much current psychological modeling shares this goal of finding
invariance at the organismic level, rather than at the level of the organism-environment system.
These engineers were in for a rude awakening however, as empirical results indicated that the
there was no single human transfer function. Rather, the human transfer function appeared to
adjust to changes in the dynamics of the controlled system. As Birmingham and Taylor (1954)
noted, the ability of the human to adjust to the environmental transfer function was so great as to
suggest "that 'the human transfer function' is a scientific will-o'-the-wisp which can lure the
control system designer into a fruitless and interminable quest." (p. 1752) Subsequent modeling
attempts (McRuer and Jex, 1967) were only successful once the search for invariance in behavior
shifted to the level of the human-machine system, rather than in human behavior alone. The
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crossovermodelof humanmanualcontrolbehaviordevelopedby McRuerandhiscolleaguesis a
statementof behavioralinvarianceat thelevelof thehuman-environmentsystem.
Why shouldthis findingconcerninghumanperceptual-motorbehaviorinformourdiscussionof
cognitive-level human-environment interaction? The answer is that there appears to be little reason
to expect that cognitive-level behavior will be any less adaptive to environmental structure than is
perceptual-motor activity. In fact, there are a variety of reasons to believe that just the opposite is
that case; i.e., that human cognitive interaction with the world is even less constrained, and thus
more flexible, than is perceptual-motor interaction. Note also that the correct response to this
situation, and the one pursued by these manual control researchers, is to describe both human and
environment as an integrated unit, and to use this unified human-environment model as a tool in the
search for behavioral invariance. Pursuing such a strategy requires formalisms capable of
expressing both intemal and external constraints on behavior in the same language, such as the
transfer function representations used to model both the manual controller and the controlled
system.
Although rarely used, this approach has been successfully applied to understanding cognitive-
level behavior. The Lens Model framework for the description and analysis of human judgement
(Brunswik, 1952; 1956; Hammond, 1955) is a unified description of both the human judge and the
environment. As such, it has been a fruitful tool in understanding both the environmental and
cognitive constraints on judgment abilities, and has been enlightening as to a number consistencies
in judgment performance that would likely not have surfaced without some mechanism for
partialing out the environmental contribution to behavior (e.g., see Brehmer and Joyce, 1988).
The recent book by Anderson (1990) describing the Rational Analysis framework also represents a
step in the direction toward integrated human-environment system modeling. This framework
provides resources to address the question of how both internal "computational" constraints and
external environmental structure combine to determine the processes that will be engaged to
perform a particular task.
When we turn to the problem of understanding the kinds of environmentally "situated"
(Suchman, 1987; Whiteside, Bennett, and Holtzblatt, 1988) activity typical of behavior in modem
human-machine systems, it is clear that much work remains to be done before an integrated human-
environment modeling approach will be possible, However, the kinds of psychological
descriptions already being proposed for describing dynamic human interaction with technological
systems indicate a clear shift toward understanding how both environmental and cognitive structure
contribute mutually to the production of skilled behavior.
In a pair of penetrating analyses of the cognitive-level ecology of human-machine systems,
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Hutchins(1987;1991) has suggested that human cognition and behavior cannot be understood
apart from the external devices in the environment that have been designed to perform cognitive
functions. In ship navigation (Hutchins, 1987), for example, human interaction with notepads,
checklists, and calculators can sometimes be used in lieu of memorial, procedural, and
computational operations; and in modem aircraft (Hutchins, 1991), much of the cognitive burden
for memory of intended and current speeds has been allocated to external memory structures within
the cockpit. In such environments, the entire cognitive function is distributed across both person
and environment. It is not surprising, then, that understanding these integrated systems requires
describing both internal and external cognitive functions in mutually compatible terms. We have
come full circle: the computer metaphor that gave rise to a description of human cognition in terms
of information processing has been turned back upon the world, as seen in the description of the
environment as external memories, external problem representations, and the like.
The importance of these environmental aids to thought and behavior cannot be underestimated.
Much of modem psychological research paints a rather dismal picture of human cognitive abilities
and limitations, leaving some of us in a state of wonder over how it can even be possible for
human cognition to have resulted in its modem achievements. But rarely does even the scientist
work in isolation from external cognitive tools, as Donald (1991) has noted.
For example, there is no internal wiring schema to support the kind of synthesis
made possible by a scientific diagram; the synthesis is out there, in the diagram itself.
The theoretician depends heavily upon a huge variety of external cognitive props --
mathematical notations, curves, plots, histograms, analog measurements, and technical
jargon -- to arrive at a theory. Without these things, thoughts of this kind would
simply not be possible, because the end-state or "conclusion" reached by the mind
is driven directly by the external representation itself. The locus of a process like
theoretical synthesis would thus be difficult to attribute to any single part of the internal-
external network that makes up such a system. (pp. 378-379).
The same comments would also apply, and perhaps in even greater force, to understanding the
mechanisms underlying skilled activity, such as flying an airplane, driving a car, or performing the
many routine tasks we find in daily life. Skilled activity is often accompanied by a heightened level
of intimacy with the world rather than by increased detachment, an observation that leads to the
hypothesis that intensive exploitation of environmental structure plays a key role in productive
behavior. As Norman (in preparation) has noted:
With a disembodied intellect, isolated from the world, intelligent behavior requires
a considerable amount of knowledge, lots of deep planning and decision making,
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andefficientmemorystorageandretrieval.Whentheintellectis tightly coupledto
theworld,decisionmakingandactioncantakeplacewithin thecontextestablished
bythephysicalenvironment,wherethestructurescanoftenaid asadistributed
intelligence,taking some of the memory and computational burden off the human.
(Chapter 10, p. 6)
The human-environment system must serve as the unit of analysis and modeling to allow the
internal cognitive activity necessary for productive behavior to be predicted as a function of
environmental design, and also to identify how necessary cognitive activity can be engineered
through environmental manipulation.
The Need for Models of Fluent Interaction with the Worm
Since the goal of the cognitive engineer is often (but not always) to create an environmental
design that promotes fluent and effective skilled behavior, the features of environments that
support fluent as opposed to cognitively intensive behavior need to be identified and described. In
many existing human-machine systems, the reason that complex cognitive processing is necessary
for effective performance is that the environments in which the operators work are quite unlike
those environments in which human psychological abilities evolved. As a result, the acquisition of
fluent modes of behavior is impeded and the end state is one of only partially effective adaptation.
The problem of "situation awareness" (e.g., Sarter and Woods, 1991) in the modern commercial
aircraft cockpit is a prime example. Edwards (1988) has gone so far as to describe the cockpit as
an "opaque veil," and Bohlman (1979) suggests that the difficulty of maintaining an active
understanding of the aircraft and airspace from cockpit displays is so great that it is appropriate to
speak of crews as constructing "theories" of their situations.
As one who tries to make a living constructing theories, I find it most unsettling to think that
theoretical abilities are sometimes necessary to ensure safe flight. What kind of psychological
theory would provide the most leverage for remedying the situation awareness problem? Because
cognitively intensive activities such as inductive inference, hypothesis generation, and mental
modeling are observed in current systems, it seems only natural that better accounts of activities
such as these are the key to enhancing interaction. Such accounts could presumably guide the
design of aids to assist flight crews in their theoretical tasks, or the design of training methods to
make crews better theoretical thinkers. It is natural to view such attempts with suspicion,
however, since problem solving aids have the potential to create their own set of human-machine
interaction problems (Woods and Roth, 1988), and training to make people more "rational"
problem solvers or decision makers has yet to be proven effective.
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Thealternativesolution,of course,is to designenvironmentsmoreconsistentlywith the
principlesunderlyingskilled,dynamichumaninteractionwith theworld. Pursuingthis strategy,
however,requirestechniquesfor environmentalmodelingcapableof representingthefeaturesof
taskenvironmentsthatbothpromoteandinhibit theacquisitionof fluentmodesof behavior.Only
modelsof productive,skilledbehaviorcanprovidetheresourcesfor atask-analyticapproach
capableof identifyingfeaturesof anenvironmentaldesignthatareinconsistentwith theprinciples
underlyingskilledactivity. Theproblemof identifyingdemandsfor complexcognitiveactivities
suchasproblemsolving,planning,decisionmakingposedby agivenenvironmentaldesignmost
requiresmodelsof skilled, fluentbehavior,not models of problem solving, planning, or decision
making activities.
Why is this the case? Due to their roots in either economic theory or artificial intelligence,
rational action models such as those mentioned above are more concerned with sufficiency
considerations than they are with necessity considerations. The great appeal of such models is
their ability to describe and often prescribe behavior in a huge variety of situations. Nearly any,
and perhaps all, behavior can be rationalized as being the result of some cognitively-intensive
process such as search through a problem space, hypothetico-deductive inference, or the
comparative evaluation of options with respect to a goal structure or utility function. No empirical
evidence could ever be brought to bear on limiting the sufficiency of these rational methods for
action selection. However, identifying when these sorts of complex cognitive activities will
actually be necessary for successful performance requires models capable of indicating when such
activities are not necessary.
My observations of skilled human behavior in complex systems have led me to the working
hypothesis that cognitively-intensive methods for action selection are used only as a last resort;
i.e., when effective perception-action solutions are not readily available. Predicting cognitive
demands thus requires modeling approaches capable of defining when effective perception-action
solutions will not be available, and this knowledge can only be provided by a theory of perception-
action skill. I realize that the claim that skilled performers will typically opt for perception-action
solutions to cognitive tasks may strike the cognitive psychologist as being counter-intuitive.
However, intuitions based mainly on laboratory findings may be skewed by the fact that
experiments on cognition are typically carefully designed to preclude the availability of perception-
action shortcuts for meeting task demands. Although my own intuitions are largely based on
observations of behavior in operational settings, even in the laboratory I am continually amazed at
the cleverness of subjects who are able to short-circuit demands for complex cognitive activity by
cuing off the whir of a disk drive or an aberration in the graphics software. I have ceased to be
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suprisedandfrustratedby suchcleverness,andhavebegunto view thetendency toward the
perceptual selection of action as a fundamental aspect of skilled behavior. There is no doubt,
however, that more empirical research is needed to clarify this issue. However, the necessary
experiments must provide rich enough environmental conditions and enough practice time so that
both cognitively-intensive and perception-action task solutions are made available. Such laboratory
experiments are rarely conducted.
These "experiments," however, are performed every day in both complex human-machine
systems and in more everyday work settings. As an example, over the past two years I have made
fairly extensive observations of the behavior of short-order cooks working busy rush periods at a
local area grill. My interest in this behavioral situation arose because skilled performance in this
setting appeared to possess many of the same properties I have observed in my more limited
observational studies in complex operational settings, and also because 24 hour access to this
environment can be readily secured for the price of a cup of coffee. And by making a well timed
food order or by initiating conversation with the cook, one even has an (albeit limited) capacity for
intervention and control over task demands.
In the environment I have studied, the cook uses an assortment of automated devices such as
fryers and ovens, combined with substantial manual activity at the grill, to coordinate the
preparation of the many items within each order, while preparing multiple orders simultaneously.
Describe this task in any formalism for rational action and the task demands appear overwhelming.
Observe this type of skilled human-environment interaction, though, and I believe the following
will be apparent. First, there is an intensive degree of intimacy in the cook's perception-action
interaction with the environment. The cook maintains tight perceptual contact with the world and
always seems to be taking some sort of action. Rarely if ever does the cook appear to engage in
detached, contemplative cognitive activity. Task demands are uncertain and arrive dynamically,
and ongoing behavior must be sensitive to a number of unpredictable events.
What allows this perceptually intensive mode of interaction to be productive? Note that the
cook's environment is highly structured, but nearly all of this structure is visible. The most
efficient "problem representation" for the cook to use is an external one: the grill area itself. Action
selection based on the external environment has considerable economies as compared to action
selection based upon internal representations of the environment. The environment considered as a
problem representation serves as an external memory capable of being perceptually accessed,
updates itself automatically and in parallel, serves as an external memory store, is internally
consistent, and is always veridical (also see Reitman, Nado, and Wilcox, 1978). The world takes
care of its own "truth maintenance."
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When uncertainties do occur using such an external representation (i.e., perceptually available
information underspecifies constraints on activity), these uncertainties can often be resolved
through perception-action rather than accessing stored knowledge. How well cooked is the
underside of a steak? Flip it and see. And the cook not only uses the structure already present in
the environment, he or she can dynamically create structure in order to make perception-action
solutions available and thereby reduce cognitive burdens. For example, the cook may organize the
placement of meats in order of doneness, may lay out dishes or plates to serve as a temporary
external memory of orders to be prepared (also see Beach, 1988), and may even generate new
information "displays" by introducing constraint in the controlled environment causing a hidden
variable to covary with a visible one. For example, the cook may adopt the strategy of continually
flipping meats so that the doneness of the top side can always be used as a reliable indicator of the
doneness of the underside. In a very real sense, the cook is both performer and on-line interface
designer.
Skilled human-environment interaction of this type is thus both a response to environmental
structure as well as a source of environmental structure to be subsequently exploited. The
environmental structure created by the cook's own "tricks" and routinized strategies plays a role
similar to the structure created through the environmental design process itself in promoting
cognitive efficiencies. The former structuring mereIy happens "on-line" and is thus short-lived,
while the latter happened during the design of the grill area and is thus reflected in the static and
permanent organization of the design. But both forms of structure, whether contributed at one
point in time by the designer or continually by the cook, result in cognitive economies through the
enablement of perception-action solutions to the task. For example, the external memories and
displays dynamically created by the cook play a similar cognitive role to the timing mechanisms
used in toasters and ovens to offload memory demands to the wor/d. Because of the possibility of
self-produced environmental structure, the acquisition of such situated skills will always resist
faithful description solely in terms of the development of more efficient internal mechanisms for
processing a fixed set of environmental information. A model of skill acquisition in dynamic
human-environment interaction would also have to describe how the actor's external environment
becomes increasingly structured by activity itself, and thus increasingly informative to the actor,
over the course of skill development.
Much of the responsibility for dynamic human-environment interaction lies in the perception-
action mechanisms at the interface between the performer and the world. The development of
skilled, dynamic interaction relies upon abilities to exploit environmental structure to obtain
perception-action solutions to tasks, and where none naturally exist, to create additional
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environmentalstructurein suchawayasto enableperception-actionsolutions.If suchstructureis
notprovidedby thedesigner,theperformerwiU seekto createit throughactivity thatintroduces
newformsof structure.Theproductivityof thismodeof behaviorrequirestheavailabilityof
sourcesof informationto specifytheenvironmentalconstraintsto whichbehaviormustbe
sensitivein ordertobeeffective,andtheavailabilityof actionscapableof bothchangingthe
environmentandof creatingadditionalsourcesof informationto furtherenabletheperceptual
guidanceof activity. Theseare,I believe,featurescommonto nearlyall environmentsin whichthe
acquisitionof fluent,dynamicinteractionis observed.Theyarealsofeatureslackingin themany
technologicalenvironmentsof interesto cognitiveengineering,duelargelyto interfacesthathighly
restrictperception-actionaccessto thecontrolledsystem.Theabsenceof suchfeaturesisone
majorcauseof thedifficulty of acquiringskills in suchsystems,andthereasonthattheendstateof
learningis oftenoneof only partiallyeffectiveadaptation.
TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
The previous discussion has centered on identifying a number of necessary conditions for
psychological models to support environmental design. It is time now to turn toward outlining a
methodological strategy with the potential to address the some of the gaps in our knowledge
discussed above. Many of the necessary features for psychological models that have been
identified are suggestive of the possibility that an ecological approach to human-environment
interaction may yield fruitful tools for cognitive engineering. The ecological approach was
pioneered by Brunswik's (1952) and Gibson's (1966, 1979) theories of how knowledge of
environmental structure can provide important constraints on psychological explanations. In
particular, Brunswik's emphasis on taking the human-environment system as the unit of analysis
and modeling, perhaps best represented in the Lens model framework (Brunswik, 1952; 1956;
Hammond, 1955), and Gibson's focus on how fluent interaction can be described as perceptual
specification of environmental constraints on activity (1979), blend nicely with the claims that
cognitive engineering is most in need of models of skilled interaction with the world, and models
which take the human-environment system as the unit of analysis.
In the following I will take some initial steps toward identifying opportunities the ecological
approach might offer for cognitive modeling to support design. However, and for readers already
familiar with Gibson's views especially, it is important to first discuss what an ecological approach
to cognitive engineering does not require. First, it does not require that we conceive of all human-
environment interaction as purely perceptually guided activity. Direct perceptual guidance of
action, as discussed by Gibson, might surely be possible although it is likely that it is specific to
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thoseinformation-richenvironmentsin whichperceptionevolvedor to artifactualenvironments
designedto mimic suchenvironments.Thereis noreasonto expecthatevolutionanticipatedthe
modernaircraftcockpitor thewordprocessor.In suchenvironmentstheneedfor post-perceptual
processesuchasproblemsolvinganddecisionmakingisquite likely. The ecological and
information processing approaches need not always be considered to be at odds, but may instead
both contribute to a more complete understanding of human-environment interaction.
Second, the adoption of an ecological approach does not necessarily imply a commitment to
studying fluent behavior in the natural environment. Gibson rallied against the use of abstract
information displays for the study of visual perception; the types of displays often found in
existing human-machine systems. But in a larger sense, Gibson, like Brunswik before him, was
arguing for using environmental conditions as the basis of scientific study that are representative of
the conditions in which a target behavior of interest occurs. And for better or worse, a cockpit or
control room looks much more like a laboratory than it does the natural terrestrial environment.
These are the target environments of interest to the cognitive engineer. For this reason, these
environments, or carefully made abstractions of them, are the places where the ecological approach
to cognitive engineering should be carried out.
Resources for Cognitive Modeling
Brunswik (1952) offered the Lens model as a description of how the human and environment
could be described in an integrated fashion, using the principle of parallel concepts (e.g., see
Hammond, Steward, Brehmer, and Steinmann, 1975). As shown in Figure 1, the Lens model is a
symmetrical framework which represents how both environmental and cognitive structure mutually
contribute to judgment performance. The organism has available a set of cues (xi's) which bear
specified relations (re,i'S) tO an environmental criterion to be judged (e.g., a medical diagnosis).
The relations between the the cues and the criterion may take various forms and vary in ecological
validity. Similarly, the ways in which the organism's makes use of the cues (rs, i's) to arrive at a
judgment may take various forms and vary in cue utilization. The framework is an expression of
the principle of parallel concepts in that each concept on one side of the model has a counterpart on
the other side. This framework has a number of attractive properties that result from representing
the organism and environment in compatible terms.
Insert Figure 1 about here
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Perhapsmostimportantly,theLensmodelframeworkallowsthemodelerto measurethedegree
to whichtheenvironmentalstructurewhichrelatesthecuesto thecriterionis reflectedin the
mannerin whichthecuesarecognitivelystructuredto produceajudgment. High levelsof
achievementareanindicationof ahighlyadaptive cognitive organization; i.e., a cognitive strategy
that mirrors the environmental structure to which behavior must be sensitive. As many of the
previous comments in this chapter suggest, some sort of adaptivity-oriented view of cognitive
activity is likely to be required in order to understand skilled human-environment interaction as
well. In addition, the Lens model allows one to localize the causes of less than fully productive
behavior to either the environmental structure, the cognitive structure, or both. Weather forcasters,
for example, frequently err in their predictions, but only an analysis of both the ecological validity
of the cue structure and their policies for cue utilization can yield an understanding of the reasons
for these errors. We often have similar interests in the design and analysis of human-machine
systems. Did a particular error result from an operator making incorrect usage of displayed
information, or was the error the result of a potentially perfectly adapted operator confronted with
not fully diagnostic information? Quite different types of remedial action can (and should) result
depending upon the answers to questions such as these.
Thus, the Lens model framework offers a good starting point for developing an approach for
representing skilled human-environment interaction. However, my previous comments suggest
that we not only require models that take the human-environment system as the unit of analysis, we
also need models capable of representing fluent, skilled behavior in order to identify demands for
more complex cognitive activity. From this perspective, the Lens model has two important
deficiencies. First, action itself is not explicitly represented. The Lens model is a epistemological
framework for the purpose of modeling judgments about the state of the world, not to represent
how actions are selected. A first step toward applying the Lens model to action selection would be
to allow an action opportunity itself to serve as the criterion to be judged. However, this
interpretation can give rise to a number of conceptual difficulties, and we must be careful in how
we go about formulating this interpretation in order to keep distinct the environmental model (facts
about the world), and the cognitive model (facts about the performer). Second, as suggested by
Hammond et al. (1975), judgment is a "cognitive activity of last resort" (p. 272). Judgmental
abilities will only be called upon when the available information only probabilistically specifies the
criterion, and actions capable of manipulating environmental variables to gain more diagnostic
information are not available. Note that these environmental properties are exactly those features of
task environments I have previously described as being the major impediments to the development
of fluent, perceptually guided interaction. Like formalisms for rational action, then, it may be quite
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possibleto interprettheskilledselectionof actionwithin theLensmodelframework,however,
suchamodelis not likely to capturethosespecialfeaturesof taskenvironmentsthatallow for the
acquistionof fluenthuman-environmentinteraction.
The need to explicitly represent f/uent interaction, as well as those features of the world that
promote it, suggest that we must consider the problem of how the environment of the skilled
performer should be described. Gibson, with his ecological physics and theory of affordances
(1979), proposed an action-oriented environmental description in order to understand how
perception may orient behavior to environmental opportunities for action. An action-oriented
approach results in a description of the environment in terms of the opportunities for action it
presents the performer. The resulting description can be called an affordance space, akin to the
decision space descriptions resulting from decision theory, the problem space descriptions
resulting from problem solving theory, or the cue space descriptions resulting from theories of
probabilistic judgment. In most cases, an affordance space will be a dynamic description of the
environment, as both the environmental structure and the performer's resources for action will
change over time and a dynamic affordance structure will result.
Note that creating an affordance space environmental description does not commit one to any
particular position concerning how affordances may be detected to guide activity. Gibson was
most concerned with those situations in which perceptual information is available to specify
affordances, and in such cases interaction can be described as the perceptual detection of
information capable of orienting behavior to action opportunities. However, in other situations
perception-action access to the environment may be restricted or impoverished, or information
other than that specifying the immediately present affordance structure must be taken into account
for behavior to be productive. In such cases, performers may have to engage in more elaborate
cognitive activity in order to detect the affordance structure, or to combine information specifying
affordances with other information in order to select actions. Regardless of the type of either
perceptual or post-perceptual activity required to orient behavior to an affordance structure, a
description of the world in terms of affordances is still a valuable tool in understanding how
environmental structure is reflected in cognition and behavior.
For our purposes, the concept of an affordance space is especially important because it provides
resources to compensate for the two deficiencies of the Lens model identified above. First, an
affordance space can in some cases play the role of the criterion in the Lens model, thus shifting
the emphasis from passive judgment to the identification and selection of opportunities for action.
Second, the possibility that perceptual information is capable of fully specifying the affordance
space (i.e., direct perception) suggests that we must relax the a priori assumption underlying the
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Lensmodelthattheavailableinformationis onlyprobabilisticallyrelatedto thecriterion. The
questionof determiningtherelationshipbetweentheavailableinformationandtheenvironmental
affordancestructureis anempiricalone.Theecologicaltaskanalysisframeworkpresentedbelow
is anattemptto integrateBrunswik'sLensmodelandGibson'saffordancetheoryintoaunified
frameworkfor modelingskilledhuman-environmentinteraction.
The Framework for Ecological Task Analysis
Integrating concepts from Brunswik's Lens model and Gibson's affordance theory results in
the ecological task analysis framework depicted in Figure 2. Like the Lens model, the proposed
framework is a symmetrical arrangement which represents the integrated human-environment
system. Not only does ecological task analysis exploit the principle of parallel concepts to capture
certain symmetries between cognitive and environmental structure, the proposed framework also
uses a principle of parallel concepts to suggest certain symmetries between perception and action.
This latter symmetry is evident in the relationship between the upper model of environmental
perceptual structure, and the lower model of environmental action structure.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Ecological task analysis begins with the creation of two complementary descriptions of the
surface structure of the environment. As in the Lens model framework, we rely upon a distinction
between environmental surface structure which exists at the interface between the performer and
the world, and the environmental depth structure which exists remotely, behind the surface
structure, so to speak. The two descriptions of surface structure, shown in the middle of the
diagram, are models of environmental perceptual structure and environmental action structure. The
description of surface perceptual structure in ecological task analysis plays a similar role to the cue
description in the Lens model. The model of surface perceptual structure describes the
environmentally available information. In human-machine systems, one can think of surface
perceptual structure as the information available from interface displays about the state of the
controlled system. Unlike the Lens model framework which captures only the surface perceptual
structure of the environment, however, ecological task analysis also requires a description of the
surface action structure of the environment. In a human-machine system, one can think of surface
action structure as the actions made available by interface controls.
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In theLens model framework, the relation between surface perceptual structure and depth
structure is the relation between the readily available information and the environmental state a
person is attempting to judge. Similarly, in the proposed framework the relation between surface
action structure and depth structure is the relation between the readily available actions and the
environmental change the person is attempting to effect. On the perceptual side, the surface/depth
distinction reflects the difference between given and inferred. On the action side, the surface/depth
distinction reflects the difference between readily available actions and intended actions. The
model of environmental depth structure on the left side of Figure 2 is a description of these
potentially covert relationships, and the model of cognitive structure on the right side of the figure
is a description of how environmental depth structure is reflected in cognition, and ultimately,
behavior.
The Principle of P_II¢I Concepts: Perceptual and Action Structure
The description of environmental surface structure in terms of both perception and action is
necessary to capture how the skilled perceptual guidance of activity is possible. The possibility for
perceptual guidance of activity relies upon the availability of perceptual information capable of fully
specifying environmental affordances. In terms of the proposed framework, perceptual guidance
of action is not to be described as the perceptual detection of surface information to infer some
covert or remote depth property of the environment. Rather, the perceptual guidance of action is to
be described as the use of one form of surface structure, namely perceptual, to specify another
form, namely, the surface action structure. As will be described in detail below, the ecological task
analysis process proceeds by examining the models of perceptual and action surface structure to
identify the congruence between these two forms of environmental description. Matches between
these two models indicate opporunities for fluent, perceptually guided activity. Mismatches
between these two models are indicative of demands for cognitive activity to overcome the
perceptual non-specification of action. Various forms of mismatch are possible: each form of
mismatch is suggestive of a different type of necessary cognitive activity, and a different type of
remedial interface design solution.
Before describing the analysis process, the symmetrical nature of the models of perceptual and
action structure must be discussed. The model of surface perceptual structure is an environmental
description using a performer s perceptual capacities as a frame of reference in which the
envirornmental structure is described. This description is relational in the sense that the resulting
environmental model reflects both the perceptual capacities of a performer and the environmental
structure. It is easy to overlook that such descriptions are actually relational in nature, as we often
22
speakasif aperceptually-generateddifferentiationof theenvironmentis purelyafunctionof the
environmentalstructureandnotafunctionof perceptualcapacities.However,thefactthatsome
formsof environmentalstructureareseenasobjectswhileothersarenot,or thefact thatsome
aspectsof theenvironmentareseenasbeingbluewhileothersarered,areasmuchfactsaboutthe
perceptualsystemastheyareof theenvironment.A perceptually-orientedenvironmentalmodelis
arelationalconstructcreatedby usingperceptualcapacitiesasaframeof referencein which
environmentalstructureismeasuredanddescribed.
Thesecondmodelof environmentalsurfacestructurerequiredfor ecologicaltaskanalysisis an
action-orientedescriptionof theenvironment.Themodelof surfaceactionstructureis an
environmentaldescriptionusingaperformersactioncapacitiesasaframeof referencein whichthe
environmentalstructureis described.Thisdescriptionisrelationalin thesensethattheresulting
environmentalmodelreflectsboththeactioncapacitiesof aperformerandtheenvironmental
structure.Thisaction-orientedenvironmentalmodelrepresentstheworld in termsof its
opportunitiesfor action.Thisenvironmentalmodelthusgeneratesadifferentiationof theworld in
termsof thedegreeto whichvariousspatiotemporalenvironmentalregionsareconsistentin
variousdegreeswith thetakingof variousactions.An action-orientedenvironmentalmodelis a
relationalconstructcreatedby usingactioncapacitiesasaframeof referencein which
environmentalstructureis measuredanddescribed.
Thesymmetricalnatureof theperceptually-orientedandaction-orientedenvironmental
descriptionsrequiredfor ecologicaltaskanalysisshouldbeapparent.Thesetwo environmental
modelsdiffer only in thatoneis relativizedto thefunctionalityof theperformersinputmechanisms
while theotheris relativizedto thefunctionalityof theperformers outputmechanisms.Thetwo
modelsthusreflecttwo differentprimitivedifferentiationsof theenvironment,onegeneratedby
usingperceptualcapacitiesto understandhow theworld is carvedupwith respecto perception,
andtheothergeneratedby usingactioncapacitiestounderstandhowtheworld iscarvedupwith
respecto action. As BarwiseandPerry(1983,p. 11)havesuggested,
Theemphasisis onhow theorganismdifferentiatesits environment,on thesortsof
uniformitiesit recognizesacrosssituations.Differentorganismscanrip thesame
realityapartin differentways,waysthatareappropriateto theirown needs,their own
perceptual abilities and their own capacities for action. This interdependence between
the structure the environment displays to the organism and the structure of the organism
with respect to the environment is extremely important. For while reality is there,
independent of the organism s individuative activity, the structure it displays to an
organism reflects properties of the organism itself. (My emphasis)
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Neithertheperceptually-orientedenvironmentaldescriptionnortheaction-oriented
environmentaldescriptionresultsin amoreprimitive,privileged,or objectiveontologicalpictureof
theworld. However,theclaimis sometimesmadethatanaction-orientedescriptionof theworld
in termsof affordancesis scientificallyillegitimatebecauseit is relativizedto theactor,andis thus
in somesensesubjective.Notethatthecorrectresponseto thispossiblecriticismis not to adoptthe
heroicpositionthataffordancesarein somesenseindependentof theperformer: theyarenot,they
arisefrom usingtheperformersactioncapacitiesasaframeof referencefor environmental
description.Rather,to counterthisargumentonemustmerelyemphasizethatthesupposedly
scientificallylegitimateperceptually-orientedenvironmentaldescriptionswhichportrayaworldof
objectsandpropertiesarejustasrelativizedto thecapacitiesof theperformerasareaction-oriented
environmentaldescriptions.Onemerelytakesperceptualfunctionalityastheframeof referencefor
environmentaldescription,while theothertakesactionfunctionalityastheframeof reference.
The Process of Ecological Task Analysis
I shall call a process whereby environmental models of surface perceptual and action structure
are created and mismatches between the environmental differentiations represented in the two
models are identified and described, an ecological task analysis of a human-environment system.
What I believe to be the central contribution of an ecological approach to cognitive modeling can
now be stated quite simply. A preliminary ecological task analysis of a human-environment
system is required to identify the degree to which an interface (natural or artificial) between the
human and environment is consistent with the principles underlying fluent interaction, and by
doing so such an analysis helps specify what cognitive processes will be necessary for effective
behavior. An ecological task analysis is thus similar in spirit to Marr s (1982) computational-level
theory which attempts to def'me the necessary functionality of vision models, and Anderson s
(1990) rational analysis which attempts to define the necessary functionality of a variety of
cognitive models. Before outlining the analysis process, a few comments comparing the goals of
ecological task analysis and Anderson s approach in particular may be valuable.
The goal of ecological task analysis is to define the necessary functionality of any cognitive
processes that may be required to support effective human-environment interaction. Like
Anderson s rational analysis, then, the present approach leaves aside the question of how any
necessary cognitive activities might be carried out. In this much the two approaches share a
common perspective. However, ecological task analysis takes human-environment interaction to
be its primary concern, whereas the current formulation of rational analysis is concerned with
cognitive activities such as memory, categorization, and problem solving. But as Anderson
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himselfhasnoted,all thesecognitive abilities are useless if they do not in some way serve the goal
of action selection, and for Anderson, action selection is to always to be understood as the result of
a problem solving or decision making exercise (p. 192). Perhaps it doesnt much matter what
words Anderson uses to describe the processes underlying action selection, but what does matter is
the nature of the environmental models that result from such a choice (decision trees and problem
state spaces).
But as our previous comments suggest, all action selection, whether resulting from cognitively
intensive processes or from more efficient perception and action, can be rationalized into one of
these frameworks for explaining productive behavior. Modeling to support design, however, must
focus not on the sufficiency of these frameworks but rather on limiting the conditions of their
necessity. Ecological task analysis, therefore, starts not by assuming action selection is governed
in any particular manner, but rather has as one if its goals to define what sorts of governing
mechanisms will be necessary for modeling any instance of human-environment interaction.
Ecological task analysis attempts to meet this goal through the use of environmental models that
allow for a description of action selection in terms of the perceptual guidance of activity. Only
when an examination of these environmental models indicates mismatches in perception-action
environmental structure will ecological task analysis result in a construal of action selection in
terms of decision making, problem solving, or any other cognitively intensive activity.
The Principle of Parallel Concepts: Environmental Depth and Comaitive Structure
As mentioned above, ecological task analysis begins with the creation of the models of
perceptual surface structure and action surface structure which provide the bridge between the
human and the environment. The analysis process proceeds by then examining the congruence
between these two models in terms of the manner in which they differentiate the environment with
respect to perception and action. The process of examining congruence will be discussed in detail
below. The result of this exercise, however, is the specification of a model of the environmental
depth structure, and a complementary model of internal cognitive structure and process. It is very
important to note that ecological task analysis requires that modeling the environmental depth
structure comes after creating the models of perception and action structure. That is, we do not
begin by assuming that the task environment possesses a certain intrinsic depth structure (e.g.,
problem state space, decision tree, linear cue-criterion function), and thereby, a corresponding
structure to cognitive processes (e.g., heuristic search, comparative evaluation of alternatives,
linear cue combination rules). Rather, we let the examination of the surface perceptual and action
structure of the environment guide the selection of the model of depth structure, and thereby the
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correspondingstructurefor cognitiveprocesses.Hereinlies themajordifferencebetweenthe
proposedapproachandmanycurrentmodelingapproachesin cognitivescience:considerationsof
perception-actionfunctionalitydefinethenecessaryfunctionalityfor cognitiveprocesses,rather
thandefiningperception-actionfunctionalitybyana priori cognitive model of action selection.
I have tried to make the case for sequencing the analysis in this fashion at a variety of previous
points in this chapter. We are obviously looking for a model of environmental depth structure that
corresponds to, and helps make sense of, the cognitive activities that will actually be engaged to
serve action selection. Which cognitive activities will be necessary for productive behavior,
however, can only be determined by a detailed analysis of the degree to which perceptually
information is available to specify productive action. Different interface (control-display) designs
for the same task environment can differ radically in terms of the cognitive demands they make
upon the performer, with the result that the cognitive model that provides the best description of the
processes underlying interaction with one interface may be quite unlike the cognitive model that
best describes the processes underlying interaction with another interface. As a result, different
environmental models will be needed in the two cases to describe the different ways in which
environmental structure is reflected in cognition and behavior in the two cases. Note, however,
that like the Lens model framework, once a model of environmental depth structure and a
corresponding model of internal cognitive processes are selected, the congruence between the
environmental and cognitive models can be examined in order to identify any ways in which
cognitive limitations or biases place constraints upon productive behavior.
This is obviously a highly schematic description of the models necessary for ecological task
analysis. Yet I wonder if it is possible to get more precise about the content of these descriptions
without doing a potential injustice to the richness of the perceptual and action structure of any
realistically complex behavioral situation. One great allure of environmental models that rationalize
action selection as decision making or problem solving is that relatively low-dimensional
environmental descriptions can be used. Such low dimensional representations are advantageous
in that they can be easily applied across a variety of contexts and are thus suggestive of how the
psychological processes underlying action selection might be organized in a context-free, general
purpose format. Describing the world in terms of the interaction of raw environmental structure
with perceptual and action capacities, on the other hand, has the potential to create environmental
models of almost unlimited dimension. Nevertheless, my own view is that any method capable of
identifying the mechanisms underlying skilled human interaction in a setting of any reasonable
complexity requires models capable of preserving many of the fine details of the environmental
structure. The richness of the world s perceptual and action structure, seemingly necessary for the
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fluentoperationof theperception-actionsystem,severelyovertaxesourhighly limitedcognitive-
linguisticresourcesfor environmentaldescription.I doubtthatatthecurrenttimeataskanalysis
techniquecapableof guidinghuman-environmentinteractionmodelingcanpossiblybemuchmore
thanachargeto themodelerto undertakethelongandarduousprocessof identifyingand
describingthepotentiallyoverwhelminglyrich interfacebetweentheperformerandtheworld.
For thisreason,thefollowing descriptionof theanalysisprocesswill consistof anabstract
discussionof thepossibleresultsof anecologicaltaskanalysis,alongwith aconcreteexampleof
how suchananalysiscanbeperformedfor aparticularbehavioralsituation.Figure3depictsfour
possibleresultsof anecologicaltaskanalysisin termsof thecongruenceof theresulting
perceptually-orientedandaction-orientedenvironmentalmodels.Thegrid linesineachof the
schematicenvironmentalmodelsindicatethemannerin whichtheenvironmentis spatiotemporally
differentiatedwith respecto eitherperceptualcapacitiesor actioncapacities.Thefourcaseswill be
describedseparately.
InsertFigure3 abouthere
Case I: Perceptual overspecification of action
In the first case shown in Figure 3, the perceived environment is over-differentiated with
respect to the environmental differentiation in terms of opportunities for productive action. Many
different perceptually distinct situations all point to a single opportunity for productive action.
Object or configural displays are one type of design solution available for coping with perceptual
overspecification of action. Object displays are an attempt to reduce the dimensionality of the
perceptual space so it becomes aligned with the lower dimensional action space. These displays
perform this function by organizing the originally over-differentiated perceptual information in
such a way that perceptually salient relational features emerge that are differentiated in a manner
identical to the differentiation reflected in the action space. When a display based solution is not
used, however, the performer will have to develop some ability to overcome perceptual
overspecification. Perceptual pattern recognition is one process that could potentially result in an
alignment of the perception and action spaces, although some naturally occurring relational
properties must be perceptually available to enable this solution. When the possibility for pattern
recognition is neither naturally supported nor supported through configural display design, it is
likely that a significant amount of categorical or instance-based learning may be required in order to
identify consistencies in the mapping from perception to action. Note, however, that there is still
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thepossibilityof fully productiveperformancein all thesecasessinceperceptionmerelyover-
specifiesaction,it doesnot misspecifyaction,asin CaseIV below.
Case II: Perceptual underspecification of action
Here the perceived environment is underdifferentiated with respect to the environmental
differentiation in terms of productive action. There is simply not enough perceptually available
information in order to uniquely specify the appropriate action alternative. One likely cause of
perceptual underspecification of action is that there is hidden-state information in the environment;
i.e., the performer must know something about the previous history of the environment, keep this
information in memory, and then integrate this memorial information with the perceptual
information in order to uniquely specify the appropriate action alternative. Building memory into
the displayed interface using trend or historical displays is one strategy for aiding performance in
such cases. Another cause of perceptual underspecification is that information about future state,
rather than past state, is not perceptually available. Perception identifies a number of action
candidates, but the selection of the appropriate action requires knowledge of the downstream
effects of an action, and these effects are not perceptually apparent. Predictor displays or fast-time
simulations are two approaches for making this information available to the performer. Unaided
performance, however, will require considerable learning before skill can be acquired.
Internalization of environmental dynamics in the form of an internal model may be necessary in
order to gain access to past or future state information. The problem solving models of Newell and
Simon can be viewed as descriptions of the cognitive activities that may be necessary when the
downstream effects of an action must be taken into consideration. Exploratory behavior, or
physically trying out solutions is a method available for taking into account information about
future state without the use of an internal model, although this form of activity may not always be
possible. A form of perceptual learning that is available to overcome initial perceptual
underspecification is perceptual differentiation (e.g., E.J. Gibson, 1969). Here, the perceptual
capacities of the performer change in order to increase the dimensionality of the perceptual space so
as to bring the perceptual differentiation of the environment into alignment with the action-oriented
environmental differentiation. Perceptual learning of this type, however, requires (perhaps initially
subtle) dimensions of stimulation to which perception can eventually become sensitive.
Case III: Perceptual specification of action
In this situation fluent performance can be expected to develop without significant cognitive
demands or conceptual learning. The performer s pre-established perceptual competencies provide
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theability for uniquespecificationof productiveaction.No rule-basedinformationintegrationis
required.Neitheris informationaboutthehistoryor futureof theenvironmentnecessary.
Therefore,no internalizationof environmentaldynamicsisrequiredtoprovidetheseformsof
information. If it werethecasethatthedesignercouldalwaysbecertainthattheperceptually-
orientedandaction-orientedenvironmentalmodelsof thehuman-environmentsystemwerecorrect,
interfacesthatsupporttheperceptualspecificationof actionwouldbeourundeniabledesigntarget.
However,if unanticipatedchangesoccurin eitherthediagnosticityof thedisplayedinformation,
thefunctionalityof theinterfacecontrols,or theenvironmentaldynamics,afluent,informationally
encapsulatedperception-actionmodeof controlmaycarryonwithouttheperformerpayingheedto
theseenvironmentaldisturbances.
(_Se IV: Perceptual misspecification of _lction
In the final case the mapping between the perceptually available information and productive
action is unruly. Behavior might well be productive in this situation, but not because the currently
perceived situation is particularly informative. Models of behavior in such situations typically
endow the performer with a considerable amount of knowledge to overcome perceptual
misspecification, or else give up hope for a deterministic account of action selection and instead opt
for finding invariance in aggregate performance through the construction of probabilistic cognitive
and environmental models. In fact, the Lens model of human judgement can be considered to be a
special case of the ecological task analysis framework under the assumptions that perception
missspecifies action (judgment), and that the environmental depth structure can be described with
cue-cue and cue-criterion correlations indicating the covert relationships among these variables. I
will have little to say about this case because, frankly, it is something of a catch-all. However, I
do think it is important to emphasize that when the modeler finds what appears to be a case of
perceptual misspecification, but yet observes productive action selection based upon perceptual
information, it is likely that the performer knows some things that the modeler does not. I suspect
that such cases are more frequent than we may care to admit. The long history of findings on the
context-sensitivity of reasoning (e.g., Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972; Johnson-Laird, 1975),
decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), and problem
solving (Kotovsky, Hayes and Simon, 1985) all demonstrate that people pay considerably more
attention to the concrete presentation of a problem situation than do many abstract cognitive
models. There is, of course, really no environmental stuff that is context as opposed to relevant
structure. Context is always defined with respect to a model; it is simply those aspects of the
environment that a given model fails to represent, and as a result, those aspects that are rendered
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incapableof producingbehavioralvariance.Findingswhichdemonstratethe intensivecontext-
sensitivityof cognitionandbehaviorcanbeseento be,in part,areflectionof thefact thatmany
currentenvironmentalmodelsareeitheroverlyabstract,or perhapsevencut acrossthegrainof the
perceptually-orientedandaction-orientedenvironmentaldifferentiationsthatarethebasis of
ecological task analysis. I suspect that in some cases the apparently unruly mappings that give rise
to complex or probabilistic accounts of cognition can be straightened out as much by increased
attention to environmental modeling as by increasingly elaborate cognitive modehng.
An Example of Ecological Task Analysis
We have performed modeling of human-environment interaction in a dynamic micro-world in
order to advance approaches that could provide resources for interface design (Kirlik, Miller and
Jagacinski, 1991). At a concrete level, the experimental apparatus consisted of rich, graphically
displayed sources of information and a mixture of both continuous and discrete controls, similar to
the kind of interface technology typical of many modern human-machine systems. At an abstract
level, the task required subjects to engage in both manual control and supervisory control
(Sheridan, 1987) of a set of semi-autonomous craft operating in a simulated world. The selection
of a supervisory control task, in which a system operator is responsible for planning and
implementing activities for (often remote) automated systems, was motivated by the introduction of
automation in many existing systems and the need to design interfaces to support this form of
interaction.
The experimental apparatus simulated the cockpit of a scout vehicle, over which subjects could
use manual (joystick) or automatic (autopilot) control. Crews used a supervisory mode of control
over four additional craft by entering strings of action commands using a text editor specifically
designed for the experiment. Subjects piloted the scout within the partially forested world shown
upon a dynamic, color graphical map or situation display showing the entire 100-square mile area
to which activity was confined. The scout s major activity was to discover hidden objects (cargo
and enemy craft) within the world. The scout was therefore equipped with a 1.5 mile radius radar
for this purpose. Subjects used the additional craft primarily to act upon the discovered objects,
i.e., to engage both stationary and mobile enemy craft and to load cargo and unload it at a home
base. Subjects also had to attend to a number of resource management constraints (e.g., fuel,
missiles, cargo capacity) in order to successfully complete each 30 minute experimental session.
The task was quite complex and many hours of practice were required to achieve mastery.
However, at skilled levels of performance the selection of action was quite rapid and a fluent and
often seamless mode of dynamic interaction characteristic of much skilled behavior was observed.
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Theapparent economy of behavior in this environment led to the hypothesis that subjects were
relying heavily upon the rich set of graphical information as an external problem representation,
with some of the attendant advantages of this processing mode as discussed above in relation to
our example of the short-order cook. However, it seemed unlikely that a perception-action mode
of control was possible in all cases, since some of the constraints upon productive action were not
easily identifiable from the displayed information, and actions were not always available to resolve
uncertainties associated with non-specific perceptual information. An ecological task analysis of
this human-environment system was performed in order to identify situations where the control-
display interface supported a perception-action processing mode, as well as those situations in
which the interface design may have required subjects to use a more cognitively intensive mode of
action selection. The results of the task analysis were used to motivate the design of a process
model capable of successfully mimicking subject behavior.
An ecolo#cal t_sk analysis of search behavior
The present example concerns modeling the selection of continuous search paths for the scout
through the simulated world. A more complete description of this model as well as a description of
environmental and cognitive modeling for dynamic discrete action selection in the laboratory task
can be found in Kirlik, Miller, and Jagacinski (1991). Figure 4 is a depiction of a world
configuration as it was displayed to subjects. The open regions, here indicated in white, were
displayed in light brown. The lightly forested and heavily forested regions, here shown as light
gray and dark gray, were displayed as light green and dark green, respectively. Only home base
(the unfilled circle) and the initial location of the scout are shown in the figure.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Searching the world for cargo and enemy craft requires consideration of two capacities for
action: scout locomotion and sighting objects with scout radar. Locomotion was most efficiently
performed in open rather than forested regions due to the need to navigate around trees. Sighting
objects, on the other hand, was more efficiently performed in lightly forested areas because objects
were considered to be more densely located in forests. In addition, the fuel range constraints
influenced search path selection since fuel expenditure rates were designed so the scout had to
refuel at home base at some point during the middle third of the experimental session.
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InsertFigure5 abouthere
Figure5 showssearchpathscreatedby two differentsubjects.Bothbeginby travelingnorth
alongtheboundaryof theinnerforest,turneastto follow thetopboundaryof this forest,loop
backwestalongtheboundaryof theupperforest,turnsouthalongtheborderof theleft forest,
visit homebasefor refueling,thendepartto theeastandthenthenorth,at whichpoint thesession
terminated.Thisboundaryhuggingbehavioresultedfrom theinteractionof thetwomajorcriteria
for searchpathselection:searchingforestswith the 1.5mile radarto discoverobjects,and
locomotingthroughopenterrainto coverasmuchareaaspossible.
Whatis themostfaithful descriptionof thecognitiveactivitiesunderlyingsearchbehavior?
Whatisanappropriatemodelfor thedepthstructureof thisenvironment?Weof coursewould like
tofind amodelof depthstructurethatcapturesthoseenvironmentalfeaturesto whichcognitionand
behaviorwassensitive.Onecouldof courseformulatethisprocessasaconstrainedoptimization
problemanduseagenerate-and-testproceduretocreatealternativepathsandthenevaluatethem
with respecto anobjectivefunction. However,thereareaninfinite numberof possiblepathsand
thecomputationaldemandsappearoverwhelming.Onecouldalsoattemptto describethisprocess
in rule-basedterms,usinganenvironmentaldescriptionin termsof perceptuallysalientobjects
suchasforestsandtheir borders.With thismodel,thecognitiveprocessesunderlyingsearch
behaviorwouldbedescribedin termsof themanipulationof symbolsstandingfor discreteaspects
of environmentalstructure.
Ecologicaltaskanalysis,on theotherhand,suggeststhatwedelayassumptionsaboutmodeling
environmentaldepthstructureandcognitiveprocessesuntil afterthemodelsof environmental
perceptualstructureandactionstructurehavebeenconstructed.An initial cut atconstructingthe
perceptually-orientedenvironmentalmodelrequiredfor ecologicaltaskanalysiswouldbeto
describetheobjectsandpropertiesperceptuallyapparenton thismapdisplay. However,aswill be
seenbelow,ecologicaltaskanalysissuggeststhatwe iterateandrefinethis initial perceptually-
orientedmodelafterconstructingtheaction-orientedmodelby usingthelatterto helpidentify any
initially overlookedperceptualinformationcapableof specifyingtheaction-orientedstructureof
thisworld. Theinformationusedasthebasisfor actionselectionmaybeconsiderablymoresubtle
andrich thantheinformationpreservedwhenusingperceptionin apurelydescriptivecapacity
(e.g.,Neisser,1988;Bridgeman,1991;Shebilske,1991).
Constructingtheaction-orientedenvironmentalmodelrequirestheuseof actioncapacitiesasa
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frameof referencefor environmentaldescription.Sincetwo actioncapacitiesunderliesearch
behavior(locomotionandsightingobjectswith radar),wemustdescribetheaction-oriented
structure,or affordances,of thisenvironmentfor bothlocomotionandsightingobjects.We will
considersearchaffordancesto bea simplecombinationof thelocomotionandsighting
affordances.Figure6 showsthedistributionof locomoting,sighting,andsearchingaffordances
asmapsof theworld in whichthepathsshowin Figure5 weregenerated.Figure6ashowsthe
worldasit appearedon themapdisplay.Figure6bshowsthelocomotingaffordance,calculated
by assigninga valueof zerofor openregions,avalueof -1.5to lightly forestedregions,anda
valueof -2.0to heavilyforestedregions.Thesevalueswereassignedtoreflect thedifficulty of
rapidly flying thescoutthroughtheseregionsdiffering in treedensity.Darkerregionson themaps
indicatehigheraffordancevalues.
InsertFigure6 abouthere
Theaffordancevalueswereselectedby attemptingto constructanobjectivemeasureof the
degreeto whichrelevantactionscouldbeperformedasafunctionof environmentalstructure.For
example,Figure6cshowstheworld sightingaffordancestructure.To constructthismap,afour
dimensionalvectorwasassociatedwith eachworld locationto indicatethepercentageof areathat
wouldbecoveredby scoutradarcenteredatthatlocationthatwasopenregion,lightly forested
region,heavilyforestedregion,andareabeyondtheworld boundaries.For eachpoint,the inner
productof thisvectorandasightingaffordancevectorwastakentodeterminethesighting
affordanceof aparticularworld location. Thesightingaffordancevectorwasthesamefor each
world locationandindicatedthedensityof cargoandenemycraftwithin eachof thefour typesof
regions.Thesightingaffordancevectorhadavalueof zerofor openregionsandareabeyond
world boundaries,andavalueof 1.0for lightly andheavilyforestedregions.A maximalsighting
affordancewouldexist,therefore,in caseswheretheentirescoutradarrangecoveredaforested
region,andaminimal sightingaffordancewouldexistwhentheentirescoutradarrangecovered
eitheranopenregionor areabeyondtheworld boundary.Thegradedstructureof thesighing
affordancedistributionresultsfrom thecomplexinteractionbetweenthecircularradarcapabilities
of thescoutandtheirregularlyshapedopenandforestedregionsthatdeterminedobjectdensity,or
moregenerally,theinteractionbetweenthesubjectsactioncapacitiesandtheenvironmental
structure.
Figure6dshowsthesearchaffordancestructure,createdby simplysummingthevaluesof the
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locomotingandsightingaffordancesateachworld location(i.e.,a locationaffordssearchif it
affordsbothlocomotingandsightingobjects).Thismaphasbeenrescaledto clearlyindicatelocal
optimain thesearchaffordancestructure.Consideredthreedimensionally,thismapindicates
peaksandridgesof highsearchaffordanceandvalleysandholesof low searchingaffordance.The
peak areas indicate the best compromise between the conflicting demands for locomotion through
open regions and sighing objects in forested regions.
In order to define opportunities for fluent perception-actions solutions to this task, and also to
define models of environmental depth structure and cognitive process, we now examine the
congruence between the perceptually-oriented and action-oriented environmental models. Note that
our original perceptually-oriented model differentiates the world differently than does the action-
oriented model. The two models are apparently out of alignment. We now ask the question,
however, what information contained within the perceptually-oriented model is available to specify
the action-oriented structure, or affordances, in this the world? Using knowledge of human
perceptual capacities together with knowledge of the displayed environmental structure, we attempt
to find a way in which perception could possibly measure the displayed world in a manner that
specifies the depth structure to the most faithful extent possible. What perceptual information
would be necessary to specify the search affordance structure?
First, note that the perceptually-oriented model differentiates the world in an isomorphic manner
to the differentiation provided by locomotion affordances. If perception can identify whether a
given location is open region, light forest, or heavy forest, then information is perceptually
available to fully specify locomotion affordances. To fully specify search affordances, however,
perception would also have to be able to measure the sighting affordance structure. Given the
manner in which sighting affordances were constructed we can define the nature of the necessary
perceptual information in this case. Specifically, when foveating at a particular world location,
perception would have to supply a measure of the amount of forested area within a circular area
defined by the 1.5 mile radar radius of the scout. Although psychophysical experiments are surely
needed to assess the degree to which this is possible (and could be straightforwardly conducted),
here I will simply assume that such perceptual judgments are possible, although we may expect
certain forms of systematic measurement errors. The result of such experiments would be an
empirically-based perceptually-oriented model of the world that indicates the information available
to specify the search affordances structure. Constructing the action-oriented environmental model,
however, was necessary to first identify what kinds of psychophysical experiments to conduct.
Let us assume for the sake of this exercise that the results of such experiments suggested that
people did have the perceptual ability to specify the search affordance structure. (If results indicated
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thesubjectscouldnotreliablyestimatethesearchaffordancestructurewewouldthenbeableto
definethekindsof cognitiveactivitiesnecessaryto do sofor behaviorto beproductive,i.e., to be
in alignmentwith searchaffordances).Whatwould searchbehaviorlook like if subjectswere
simplyallowingsearchbehaviorto begovernedbytheperceptuallydetectedsearchaffordances?
We wouldperhapsexpectin thiscasethatthescoutwouldbeflown up thesteepestgradientin the
searchaffordancestructurefrom its presentposition. But while thelocalorganizationin search
pathsmaybedescribablein thisfashion,searchpathsalsohaveaglobalorganizationthatis not
well capturedbythis simplesearchmodel.
Thismismatchbetweenobservedbehaviorandthebehaviorthatwould resultfrom a simple
perception-actionsolutionto this taskis suggestiveof whatkindsof additionalcognitivedemands
this taskmakesupontheperformer.Weconstruelong-rangeor globalpathplanningasthe
selectionof asequenceof waypointsto bevisited,whereeachwaypointis apeakor ridgein the
searchaffordancestructure.We still can,however,construeshort-rangeor local navigationin
termsof thesimpleperception-actionmodeldiscussedabovethatresultsin searchaffordance
gradientascent.Theselectionof anappropriatesequenceof waypointsis constrainedtheneedto
avoidbacktrackingthroughpreviouslysearchedregions,andalsotheneedto returnto homebase
atsomepointin themiddlethirdof themission.Thereisno readilyavailableperceptual
informationcapableof specifyingtheseconstraintsuponproductiveactivity. Thus,wehaveacase
of perceptualunderspecificationof action,wherethesubjectmustapparentlytry outa numberof
alternativesolutionsto assessthedownstreameffects(i.e.,consistencywith backtrackingandfuel
constraints)of each,priorto selectingaglobalsearchpath.
InsertFigure7 abouthere
Theresultingmodelis shownin Figure7. At thestartof a session,themodelidentifiesthe
peakareasin thesearchaffordancemapascandidatewaypointsto visit duringamission. These
peakareasweresubmittedto agenerate-and-testmechanismthatattemptedto orderthewaypoints
to acceptablymeetbacktrackingandfuelconstraints.Notethatalthoughacognitivelyintensive
processis neededfor thispurpose,arelativelysmallnumberof waypointsareconsidered,since
thesearchaffordancestructurecanbeusedtoobtainarelativelylow-dimensionalrepresentationof
theworld for long-rangepathplanning(i.e.,thesetof localoptima).Manyof thefinedetailsof
localsearchaffordancestructurecanbeignoredduringthisprocess.Theoutputof thisprocessis
anorderedsequenceof waypoints.Thefirstwaypointis thenselectedasadestinationandwas
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thusconsideredto possessanaffordancefor visiting. Thescoutdid not fly in a linearpathto the
waypoint,however,sincescoutmotionwasdeterminednotonly bythevisiting affordancebut
alsoby thelocalsearchaffordancestructurein thevicinity of thescout.Detailedmotion
commands for the scout were created by considering the perceptua/ly-measurable search affordance
structure to operate upon the scout as an attractive force field, which when combined with the a
force exerted by the visiting affordance of the current waypoint, determined the direction of motion
on a second by second basis. Large weights on the local search affordance values relative to the
weighting on the visiting affordance provided by the current waypoint resulting in meandering
motion that was very sensitive to search affordance structure. In contrast, a large weight on the
visiting affordance relative to the local search affordances resulted in a direct path to the current
waypoint which largely disregarded the local search affordance structure. This search model was
one component in a complete process model of skilled human-environment interaction in the
laboratory task. An evaluation of the empirical adequacy of the process model can be found in
Kirlik, Miller, and Jagacinski (1991).
CONCLUSION
I have tried to make the case that modeling to support design requires theories which take the
integrated human-environment system as the unit of analysis. Ecological task analysis is offered as
a framework in which the search for the mechanisms underlying human-environment interaction
can be carried out. It is quite clear that much work remains to be done in order to flesh out the
details of ecological task analysis. The proposed framework is in no way a new theory of
cognition, although it may be considered to be a theory of the more global phenomenon of human-
environment interaction. As such, it does not contribute any new models of cognitive processes or
behavior, but rather, it guides the process of modeling any particular instance of interaction,
relying upon the perception-action and cognitive models the scientist may already have available.
In addition, ecological task analysis provides resources for design. For an already existing design
concept, it assists in the identification of cognitive demands through the process of identifying
match and mismatch in perception-action environmental structure. The results of such an analysis
can then specify the design of displays and controls that bring perception and action structure into
better alignment.
Modeling skilled human-environment interaction that relies upon the intensive exploitation of
environmental structure promises to be a messy business. We are led to this conclusion once we
36
accepthepossibilitythattheability to skillfully performwithin sucha widerangeof environments
is atestimonyto ouradaptiveabilities,ratherthantestimonyto anyabstract,context-free,general-
purposemethodswemayhavefor theselectionof action.Perhapsweonly resortto general-
purposemethodsfor actionselectionwhenwefail to find (oradjusttheenvironmentto allow)
moreefficientperception-actionsolutionswhichareenabledbyexploitingmanyof theconcrete
detailsof theperceptionandactionstructuresof ourworld. Thesearchfor modelsof skilled
interactionshouldnotbemisleadby thefact thatwhatpeoplecandomostefficientlymaybe
hardesto describe,andwhatwedomostinefficientlymaybeeasiesto describe.
ThroughouthischapterI haveadmittedlytakenacavalierattitudewith respecto anumberof
detailedpsychologicalissues.This is notbecauseI donot think suchissuesareimportant,but
ratherbecauseit is all tooeasy(for me,atleast)to getsoenamoredwith psychologicalminutiae
thattheforestis lost for thetrees.Thus,theemphasishasbeenon theissuehow wewill know a
cognitivemodelcapableof guidingenvironmentaldesignwhenweseeone. In orderto takesome
positivestepsin thisdirection,I havehadto pointout thedeficiencesof varietyof existing
modelingapproachesin cognitivescience.I havenotdonethisoutof lackof respectfor such
research.It is simplythecase that the constraints that guide modeling in normal scientific practice
are quite different than the constraints that must guide modeling to support design. Constraints
give rise to problem decompositions, problem decompositions give rise to sets of solutions, and
these solutions give rise to new problems when we aim for theoretical integration, as we must to
support design. I quite expect that someone else will come along and criticize my own proposals
for decomposing the cognitive modeling problem. Perhaps the social structures and physiological
stressors operative in human machine systems cannot be so easily cleaved from the cognitive
factors as many of us normally assume. If the failure to describe the role of such factors is a major
impediment to design, we should welcome these criticisms of our theories as well.
Those with concrete design experience may claim that I have done for the design process what I
have tried to guard against in the modeling process: over-rationalization of behavior. Current
design practice is in many cases a far cry from the explicit problem solving search over
environmental models I have portrayed. However, much of the chaos of the design process may
be due to the lack of a sound theoretical basis. One must be on guard against proposing design
aiding strategies that are too tightly linked to current design activity lest one run the risk of treating
the symptoms rather than the cause. Obviously I believe that treating the cause requires an explicit
statement of the kinds of psychological models necessary to support cognitive engineering. The
design community must police its own research, for no one is likely to produce readily applicable
models unless that is the explicit goal.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. The Lens model of Brunswik.
Figure 2. The Ecological task analysis framework. Like the Lens model framework for human
judgment, the ecological task analysis framework represents the integrated human-environment
system in a symmetrical arrangement. Matches between the perceptually-oriented and action-
oriented environmental differentiations indicate opportunities for the fluent perceptual guidance of
activity. Structural mismatches between the models of surface perceptual structure and surface
action structure are indicative of demands for cognitive activity, and corresponding models of the
environmental depth structure.
Figure 3. Four possible results of an ecological task analysis. Each case reflects a different type
of match or mismatch in environmental perception and action strucuture, and is thus indicative of a
different form of cognitive demands, and a different type of remedial interface design solution.
Figure 4. Map display showing home base, the scout, and forested areas.
Figure 5. Search paths produced by two different subjects in the same world configuration.
Figure 6. Four representations of the same world. (a) Displayed representation. (b) Locomotion
affordance representation. (c) Sighting affordance representation. (d) Search affordance
representation scaled to emphasize local optima in the affordance structure.
Figure 7. Process model of search path generation. Local optima in the search affordance
structure are organized into a series of waypoints via a generate-and-test scheduler. Detailed scout
motion is produced by a combination of attractive forces from both the current waypoint and the
local search affordance structure in the vicinity of the scout.
